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DOES THE RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT BECOME SEVERED BY OPERATION
OF THE BANKRUPT LAW?
Referee Hotchkiss, of Buffalo (In re Collignon, 4 Am.
B. R. 250), 19oo, in speaking of unaccrued rent, says:
"The law has been fairly well settled, and seems to be that,
at the time of the bankruptcy, installments of rent accruing
thereafter are neither provable debts against the bankrupt's
estate, nor affected by his discharge." Citing In re Jeffer-
son (2 Am. B. R. 2o6), 93 Fed. 948 (1899) ; In re Goldstein
(2 Am. B. R. 603), 1 N. B. N. 422 (1899); Inre Shilliday,
i N. B. N. 475 (1899) ; In re Mahler, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 70
(1899).
As to the proposition that installments of rent, accruing
after an adjudication of bankruptcy, are incapable of being
proven, there is no doubt whatever that such is the accepted
rule. But there is a difference of opinion amongst judges
and referees as to such rent itot being affected by a discharge.
In other words, it has been decided in some tribunals that,
"the relations of landlord and tenant are severed by opera-
tion of the bankrupt law ;" while in other jurisdictions it is
as emphatically laid down that the relation is "not deter-
mined by the bankruptcy of the lessee."
Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 the ju-
dicial utterances on the subject of the effect of bankruptcy
on unaccrued rent have been three in number, viz.: those of
Judge Evans, of the District Court of Kentucky, In re Jef-
ferson, 93 Fed. 848, 2 Am. B. R. 206 (1899) ; Judge Lowell,
of the District Court of Massachusetts, In re Ells, 3 Am. B.
R. 564 (19oo) ; and Judge Purnel, of the District Court of
North Carolina, in Bray v. Cobb, 3 Am. B. R. 788 (19oo).
In addition to the opinions of the aforesaid U. S. Circuit,
Court Judges, there are quite a number of reported opinions
of referees, representing jurisdictions in various parts of
the country.
Judge Evans, in the course of his opinion In re Jefferson
(supra) says: "The court sees no way to avoid the conclu-
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sion that the relation of landlord and tenant in all such cases
ceases, and must of necessity cease when the adjudication is
made. If the relation does cease, the landlord afterwards has
no tenant and the tenant has no landlord. At the time of the
adjudication the bankrupt is clearly absolved from all con-
tractual relations with, and from all personal obligations to,
the landlord growing out of the lease, subject to the remote
possibility that his discharge may be refused,-a chance not
worth considering. After the adjudication there is no obli-
gation on the part of the tenant growing out of the lease.
He not only owes no subsequent duty, but any attempt on
his part to exercise any of the rights of a tenant would make
him a trespasser. His relations to the premises and to the
contract are henceforth the same as those of a stranger. He
can neither use nor occupy the property. No obligation on
his part to pay rent can arise when he can neither use nor
occupy the property. The one follows the other, and it
seems clear that no provable debt, and indeed no debt of any
sort against the bankrupt, can arise for future rent. No
rent can accrue after the adjudication in such a way as to
make it the debt of the bankrupt."
In line with this opinion is Bray v. Cobb (supra), in Which
Judge Purnel says, inter alia: "An adjudication in bank-
ruptcy terminates all contractual relations of the bankrupt.
The object of the proceeding is to administer completely the
bankrupt's estate, to collect his assets, apply them to the
payment of his debts then owing and discharge him from
further liability. As to the rent . . . , the contractual
relations being terminated, a landlord is not entitled to prove
a claim for rent against a bankrupt after such bankrupt
ceases to use the building. The relations of landlord and
tenant are severed by operation of the bankrupt law."
On the other hand we have the opinion of Judge Lowell,
of Massachusetts, In re Ells (supra), in the course of which
he states that: "The law concerning the effect of bankruptcy
upon a leasehold is stated in ex parte Houghton, i Low. 554,
Fed. Cas. No. 6725 (1871): 'The eaTlier law of Eng-
land, which we have adopted in this country, was that the
assignees of a bankrupt have reasonable time to elect whether
they will assume a lease which they find in possession, and if
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they do not take it, the bankrupt retains the term on pre-
cisely the same footing as before, with the right to occupy
and the obligation to pay rent. If they do take it, he is re-
leased, as in all other cases of valid assignment, from all
liability, excepting on his covenants; and from these he is not
discharged in any event.'" (See also Hall, "Landlord and
T.," 346.)
"I can find nothing in the act of 1898 to produce a result
different from that of the act of 1867. Had there been no
clause giving the lessor the right to re-enter, the trustee in
bankruptcy would have had a reasonable time to elect
whether to assume or to refuse the lease. If he had assumed
it, the bankruptcy would have operated like any other assign-
ment, and would have released the bankrupt from all lia-
bility, except upon those of his covenants not already broken
which would have remained binding upon him after any
assignment. If the trustee had refused to take the lease,
the bankrupt would have remained as before."
Judge Lowell then considers the opinion of Judge Evans
In re Jefferson (supra), and comments thereon as follows:
"With all respect for the learned judge, I must think the
above remarks made somewhat hastily, unless they are to
be taken as limited to the particular lease in question, or
made to depend upon some peculiar statutes of Kentucky.
It follows, then, that the lease here in question was
not determined by the bankruptcy of the lessee, but only by
the re-entry of the lessor. Savory v. Stocking, 4 Cush. 607
(1849) ; Treadwell v. Marden, 123, Mass. 390 (877)."
The opinions of referees, on the question under discus-
sion, are numerous and various. The majority of them
seem to incline to the idea that the relations of landlord and
tenant are not severed by bankruptcy of the tenant, although
others view the question from the opposite standpoint.
It is, perhaps, interesting to notice that Vol. IV, No. 2,
of the advance sheets of Am. B. R. has the two views ex-
pressed within the space of nine pages. On page 246 (In re
Arnstein et al.) (i9oo), Referee Pendleton, of the Southern
District of New York, holds that a lease is terminated and
the right to collect unaccrued rent gone where the landlord,
after the bankruptcy of the lessee, rents the property to the
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trustee and receives compensation therefor, and the property
is thereafter surrendered by the trustee to the landlord. In
the case next reported in the same pamphlet, viz., In re Col-
lignon, page 259 (i9oo), Referee Hotchkiss, of the North-
ern District of New York, opines that, rent to accrue on a
lease not expired at the time of the bankruptcy is not affected
by the bankrupt's discharge.
Perhaps the opinion which evidences the most careful
preparation and which thoroughly discusses the question is
that of Referee Harlow P. Davock, of the Eastern District
of Michigan, In re Mahler, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 70. In that case
the referee holds that a lessor's rights against the bankrupt
are unaffected by the discharge in bankruptcy, but he can
collect payment from after-acquired property only. He
reasons that rent afterwards to accrue, not being a personal
debt, is not provable and, unless the creditor, at the time
allowed for proving claims, be able to produce and verify
such debt, he will not be entitled to receive from the bank-
rupt's estate his dividend; ergo, he should not be barred from
his future action against the bankrupt.
Referee Davock's opinion bristles with authorities, both
English and American. He cites cases construing the
former bankruptcy acts, and all of the cases referred to by
him seem to sustain his view of the case; although, had he
been so inclined, he, doubtless, might have found some cases
in support of the opposite view of the question, even under
the former bankruptcy acts. For example, there is In re
Breck, 12 N. B. R. 215, 8 Ben, 93; Fed. Cas. 1822 (1875).
In that case (which was under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867)
Judge Blatchford, of the U. S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, said that a lease, which cannot be
assigned without the consent of the landlord, is canceled by
the bankruptcy of the tenant.
Referee Davock's opinion,' weighted with "numberless
precedents," is in strange contrast to Judge Evans' decision
In re Jefferson (supra), which is a bare but logical and fair-
minded exposition of the law, based upon the broad ground
of public policy.
While it is true that no prior decision should be reversed
without good and sufficient cause, yet .the rule of stare. de-
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cisis is not in any sense ironclad, and the future and perma-
nent good to the public is to be considered rather than any
particular case or line of cases. Precedent should not have
an overwhelming or despotic influence in shaping legal de-
cisions. The benefit to the public in the future is of greater
moment than any incorrect decision in the past.
Of the four bankruptcy acts passed by Congress, the Act
of 1867. is the only one which, in specific and direct terms,
refers to the subject of rent. Section 19 of that act pro-
vides that where the bankrupt* is liable to pay rent or other
debt falling due at fixed and stated periods, the creditor may
prove, for a proportionate part thereof, as if the same ac-
crued from day to day, and not at such fixed and stated
periods. This act, like all the other bankruptcy acts, is, how-
ever, silent on the question of a bankrupt's liability for future
accruing rent.
What is the object of the bankruptcy law? Is it not two-
fold, viz., ( i ) the distribution of the property of an insolvent
debtor amongst his creditors and (2) the discharge of the
debtor from his liabilities? It re Klein, i How. (U. S.)
227; In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; In. re Reiman et al., i i
B. R. 21.
That being the case, and the fact that legislation and judi-
cial decision should, as far as practicable, be based upon the
broad ground of public policy, does it not seem proper that
a discharge in bankruptcy should sever the relations of land-
lord and tenant? Alexander the Great, at Gordium, unable
to find the ends of the knot which fastened the famous
chariot, cut the cords asunder with his sword, and, tradi-
tion doth say, was thus enabled to conquer the world. Judge
Evans, with the apodictical sword of common sense, has cut
the cords of "dialectical subtleties" which would not release
the bankrupt from the very obligations that he sought the
law to relieve him of.
John M. Patterson.
